Skip to main content

Guide

Two-Factor Authentication for Your Money Apps

Text-message codes are the weakest second factor your bank offers. How to switch to an authenticator app or passkey — and stay in if you lose your phone.

By MoneyHabit Editorial Team

9 November 2026 · 15 min read

Smartphone showing a shield with a checkmark beside a security key and gold coins, deep navy and emerald illustration
In this article

Your bank password is probably already out there. Passwords leak in data breaches every week, get guessed, get phished, and get reused across sites. The thing standing between a leaked password and an emptied account is the second factor — and not all second factors are equal. The text-message code your bank sends you is the weakest one it offers. America's cyber agency now says, in plain words, not to use it. This guide shows you how to replace it with something stronger, in about ten minutes, and how to make sure you can still get back in when you lose your phone.

What two-factor authentication actually is

Two-factor authentication (2FA) asks for two different kinds of proof before letting you in: something you know (a password), something you have (your phone, an authenticator app, or a physical security key), or something you are (a fingerprint or your face). A password plus a code from your phone is two factors; a password plus a second password is not. The point is that stealing one factor should not be enough. That logic only holds if the second factor is genuinely hard to steal — and a six-digit code texted to your number is tied to the number, not to you. Phone numbers can be moved.

Any second factor beats no second factor. But the gap between the weakest and the strongest is now so wide that the official guidance has changed: keep SMS only where nothing better exists.

The methods, ranked strongest to weakest

The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) publishes its own strongest-to-weakest ranking. Here it is, with what each method actually stops.

MethodWhat it isStops a stolen password?Stops a SIM swap?Stops a phishing site?
Passkey or hardware security key (FIDO)A cryptographic key on your device or a USB/NFC key you tap; you unlock it with your fingerprint or faceYesYesYes
Authenticator app (TOTP)An app that generates a new six-digit code every 30 seconds, on your phone, with no signal neededYesYesNo — a code typed into a fake site can be relayed
Push prompt with number matchingYour bank's app asks you to tap a number shown on the login screenYesYesMostly — the number ties the approval to the real login
SMS or voice codeA code texted or read to your phone numberYesNoNo
Email codeA code sent to your inboxYesYesNo — and your email is often the recovery route for everything else

The practical order of preference is simple: a passkey or security key wherever it is offered, an authenticator app next, and a text-message code only when the service offers nothing else.

An SMS code travels unencrypted across the mobile network, and it is delivered to whoever currently controls your number. That is the hole a SIM swap exploits: a scammer convinces your mobile carrier — with a fake ID, a stolen detail, or a bribed shop employee — to move your number onto their SIM card. From that moment, your bank's codes arrive on their phone. Your password, phished or leaked, plus their SIM, is a full login.

The numbers show the attack is real, even as reported US losses have fallen from their peak — from $72.7 million across 2,026 complaints in 2022 to $17.4 million across 971 complaints in 2025, according to the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center. The average reported loss in 2025 was about $17,885 per complaint — still one of the highest average losses of any crime type the IC3 tracks. And the UK picture is moving the other way: Cifas, the UK fraud prevention service, recorded unauthorised SIM swaps up 1,055% in 2024, up a further 38% in 2025, and up 402% in the first half of 2026. A 2020 Princeton study found the underlying weakness is structural: researchers succeeded in 39 of 50 SIM swap attempts against the five major US prepaid carriers, using only insecure authentication at the carrier.

Regulators have responded. The US Federal Communications Commission adopted SIM swap rules in November 2023 requiring carriers to authenticate customers securely before moving a number. In July 2025, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published SP 800-63B-4, which lists codes sent over the phone network as its only "restricted" authenticator — an organisation that uses them must offer an unrestricted alternative, warn users about the risk, and plan for the day they are no longer allowed. In December 2024, CISA put it bluntly: "Do not use SMS as a second factor for authentication." It added that authenticator codes are better than SMS but still phishable, and that only FIDO authentication is phishing-resistant.

The honest caveat: an SMS code is still far better than no second factor at all. A Google study found that an SMS challenge to a recovery phone blocked 100% of automated bots, 96% of bulk phishing attempts and 76% of targeted attacks. If your bank offers nothing stronger, keep the text codes switched on — then ask the bank when it will offer an authenticator app or passkeys.

The ten-minute setup

Switching your money accounts from text codes to an authenticator app takes about ten minutes per account. Do your email first — it is the recovery route for almost everything else — then your bank, your brokerage, and your payment apps.

Step 1: Pick an authenticator app

Any app that follows the open TOTP standard works with any service that offers authenticator codes. The well-known free options are Google Authenticator and Microsoft Authenticator; password managers such as 1Password and Bitwarden can also generate the codes. Google Authenticator now offers optional cloud backup of your codes; Microsoft Authenticator backs up to your Microsoft account. Pick one app and use it for everything, so you always know where your codes live.

Step 2: Find the setting in each account

Look under Security, Sign-in, or Privacy settings for "two-factor authentication", "two-step verification", or "authenticator app". If the account only offers text codes, switch it on anyway and check back — banks add authenticator and passkey support regularly, and the setting usually appears there first.

Step 3: Scan the QR code

Choose "authenticator app" as the method and the service will show a square QR code. Open your authenticator app, tap to add an account, and point your camera at it. If the camera will not cooperate, most services also show a text setup key you can type in by hand. The app will immediately start showing a six-digit code that changes every 30 seconds.

Step 4: Prove it works, then test it

Type the current code back into the service to confirm the setup. Then sign out and sign back in once, using the code, to prove the whole loop works while you still have the setup screen open.

Step 5: Save the backup codes — this is the step people skip

Most services show a set of one-time backup codes when you switch on 2FA — often ten codes, each usable once. Save them in your password manager or print them and keep them somewhere safe, not on the same phone. They are your way back in if the phone is lost, stolen, or wiped. If you use up most of them, generate a fresh set from the same security page; reissuing cancels the old ones.

The trap CISA warns about: adding an authenticator app does not automatically remove SMS from your account. Many services keep the text code as a fallback, so a SIM swap can still get an attacker in through the back door. After setting up the app, go back into the security settings and remove the phone number as a sign-in method wherever the service allows it.

What your bank actually offers

Banks have been slower than tech companies to move beyond text codes, but the picture changed through 2025 and 2026. Availability varies by account type and rolls out gradually, so treat this as a starting point and confirm in your own app — never take a third-party list as a promise about your account.

ProviderStronger option reported availableNotes
FidelityStandard authenticator app (TOTP) + passkeysSwitched to standard TOTP on 26 March 2025, dropping its old Symantec VIP requirement; any authenticator app works
Charles SchwabSymantec VIP app or hardware tokenStandard authenticator apps are not supported — it has to be VIP; one VIP token can be registered at several firms
VanguardHardware security key (YubiKey) + passkeysRegister at least two keys so losing one does not lock you out
ChasePasskeysRolled out for chase.com sign-in in early 2026; in-app biometric login already existed
Bank of AmericaHardware security key as a second factorNo standard authenticator app; passkeys have appeared on its Merrill brokerage platform
U.S. BankPasskeysAdded in November 2025

Reports differ on some banks — Citi, for example, is described as SMS-only in some mid-2026 checks and as having passkeys live in others — which is itself the lesson: the setting in your own app is the only source that matters. If your bank offers nothing beyond a text code, the most useful thing you can do is set a carrier PIN and a number-transfer lock with your mobile provider (see the lost-phone plan below), and ask the bank when stronger options are coming.

Passkeys: the upgrade that removes the code entirely

A passkey replaces the typed code with a cryptographic key pair. The private key stays on your phone, computer, or security key; the public half sits with the service. When you sign in, your device proves it holds the private key — unlocked by your fingerprint or face — and the proof is tied to the real website, so a fake login page cannot use it. There is nothing to type, nothing to intercept, and nothing for a SIM swap to steal.

Adoption is moving fast. The FIDO Alliance estimated that more than 15 billion user accounts worldwide were capable of using passkeys by the end of 2024, and surveys put about 69% of consumers as having enabled a passkey on at least one account. Dashlane's 2026 report counted 2.5 million passkey authentications a month by its users — nearly double the year before — and finance leads the growth, with five of its twenty fastest-growing passkey domains in financial services. Microsoft's own analysis found passkey sign-in about three times faster than a password, and about eight times faster than a password plus a texted code.

Where a money app offers a passkey, take it. Set it up on the device you use most, make sure it is backed up — passkeys in iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager sync across your devices, while a passkey stored only on one phone dies with that phone — and keep an authenticator app or backup codes as the fallback until you are sure the passkey works everywhere you sign in.

The lost-phone plan

The most common reason people avoid stronger 2FA is the fear of being locked out of their own money. That fear is manageable if you set up recovery before you need it.

  • Save the backup codes. Ten one-time codes, in your password manager or on paper in a safe place. This alone solves most lockouts.
  • Turn on cloud backup in your authenticator app. Google Authenticator and Microsoft Authenticator both offer it. If your app does not back up, keep a second device — an old phone or a tablet — with the same accounts enrolled.
  • Set a carrier PIN and a number lock. Call your mobile provider or use its app to add a port-out PIN and a SIM-change lock. This is the single most effective defence against SIM swaps, and it costs nothing.
  • Keep a second sign-in route for email. Your email account is the recovery path for your bank, your brokerage, and your authenticator backup. Give it a passkey or a security key, plus backup codes of its own.
  • Know the recovery path. If you are fully locked out, the route back is usually the bank's identity check — a branch visit with ID, or a video call with documents. It is slow by design. Backup codes exist so you never need it.

When you get a new phone, move the authenticator first: sign in with the old phone or a backup code, remove the old enrolment, and set up the new one. Do it while the old phone still works — setting up 2FA without the old device is the painful version of this job.

Five mistakes that undo good 2FA

1. Leaving SMS switched on as a fallback. The strongest authenticator in the world is useless if a text code still opens the same account. Remove the phone number as a sign-in method wherever you can.

2. Approving push prompts you did not ask for. Attackers bombard victims with sign-in approval requests, hoping one gets tapped just to make the notifications stop. This is called push fatigue. Never approve a prompt you did not just trigger yourself; if prompts arrive unprompted, change your password immediately.

3. Sharing a code with anyone, ever. No bank, no support agent, and no fraud team will ever ask for your 2FA code. A code you read out over the phone is a code you have given away — it is valid for 30 seconds, which is all an attacker needs.

4. Setting up 2FA and skipping the backup codes. Without them, a lost phone becomes a multi-day identity-verification ordeal with your bank. Save them at setup time, when they are on the screen in front of you.

5. Using the same phone number as the recovery method for everything. One number protecting your email, your bank, and your brokerage is one point of failure. Vary recovery methods, and give your email — the master key — the strongest protection of all.

A note for UK readers

The UK's National Cyber Security Centre gives the same advice in its own terms: a code sent by text is the most widespread second factor but not the most secure, and services should offer users a choice. Its guidance also says a second factor should be demanded for high-impact actions — moving money, changing account details — and whenever a sign-in looks suspicious. UK banks commonly offer in-app approval, card readers, or authenticator codes rather than text alone — check your bank's security settings for the strongest option it offers, and set a SIM-swap lock with your mobile provider, which the major UK networks all support.

Frequently asked questions

Is an authenticator app really safer than a text code?

Yes, for the attack that matters most to money accounts. The code is generated on your device, so it keeps working without signal and cannot be intercepted in transit or stolen by moving your number to another SIM. Its weakness is phishing: a code typed into a convincing fake site can be relayed in real time. That is why passkeys and security keys, which cannot be phished, sit above it.

What if I lose my phone?

Use a backup code to sign in, then remove the old authenticator enrolment and set up the new phone. If you have cloud backup switched on in the authenticator app, your codes restore with the app. If you have neither, you will need the service's identity-recovery process — usually ID documents and a wait. This is the single best reason to save backup codes at setup time.

Do I need a different authenticator app for each bank?

No. One app holds codes for as many accounts as you add — Fidelity, your email, your password manager, and your bank can all live in the same app. The exception is Schwab, which requires its Symantec VIP app rather than a standard one.

Are passkeys safe? What if someone steals my phone?

A passkey on its own is useless without your fingerprint, face, or device PIN, so a stolen phone does not hand over your accounts. The real risk is a passkey stored only on one device with no backup — keep passkeys in a synced manager such as iCloud Keychain or Google Password Manager, and keep backup codes as well.

My bank only offers text codes. What should I do?

Keep the text codes switched on — they still block the overwhelming majority of automated attacks — and add the protections you control: a carrier PIN and number lock with your mobile provider, a strong unique password, and a passkey or security key on your email account. Then ask the bank when it plans to add authenticator or passkey support; customer demand is one of the things that moves these roadmaps.

Key takeaways

  • Text-message codes are the weakest second factor: CISA says not to use SMS, and NIST now classes phone-network codes as its only "restricted" authenticator.
  • SIM swaps are the attack that breaks SMS — 971 US complaints and $17.4 million in reported losses in 2025, with UK cases up 402% in the first half of 2026.
  • An authenticator app is the best upgrade most people can make today: free, works offline, and immune to SIM swaps. Set it up on your email first, then your money apps.
  • Passkeys and hardware security keys are the strongest option — phishing-resistant by design — and banks including Chase, Fidelity, and Vanguard now offer them.
  • Adding an authenticator does not remove SMS by itself. Go back and remove the phone number as a sign-in method, and save your backup codes the day you set up.

The next step

Open your email account right now and check what its second factor is. If it is a text code, switch it to an authenticator app or a passkey, save the backup codes, and set a carrier PIN with your mobile provider. Ten minutes, three settings, and the account that guards all your other accounts is no longer protected by the weakest lock available. Then do the same for your bank — your future self, standing in a phone shop with a dead handset, will be glad you did.

Sources

Share this article

MoneyHabit Editorial Team

The MoneyHabit editorial desk researches, writes and reviews every article against our editorial policy.

More from MoneyHabit Editorial Team

The Sunday Habit

One useful money idea, every week.

A short, practical email every Sunday — no spam, no selling your address, unsubscribe anytime.

Advertisement

More in Financial Technology